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Summary 
 
s the post-2016 political context becomes embedded, there is profound uncertainty 
about the long-term impact of digital media on the civic cultures of liberal democracies. In 
this article, I argue that the legacy of research on digital media and politics has created 
four epistemological problems that have hindered attempts to make sense of what amounts to 
a new crisis of public communication. Research in the field has tended to select cases that are 
progressive or pro-liberal democratic and it has usually employed what I term the engagement 
gaze. Research has underestimated the trade-offs between affective solidarity and rational 
deliberation and it has been driven by a rationality expectation that neglects the role of 
indeterminacy in digital culture. For more than twenty years, researchers have focused on 
whether online “engagement” was being sufficiently embedded in political or journalistic 
organizational settings, irrespective of the motivations and ideological goals of those who 
actually engage. This has often obscured problematic aspects of how digital media may be 
reshaping the formation of public opinion and behaviour in ways that contribute, alongside 
other factors, to the erosion of liberal democratic norms of authenticity, rationality, tolerance, 
and trust. Addressing these epistemological challenges—a project already underway across a 
range of research endeavours—will better equip the field for the future.1 
 
  
 
1 I first aired the ideas presented here in two panels at the International Communication Association Annual 
Conference in Prague in May 2018—“Biq Questions in Political Communication Research” and “Social Media 
Platforms: A Crisis of Democracy?”—and in keynote speeches to the International Journal of Press/Politics Annual 
Conference at the Reuters Institute for the Future of Journalism in September 2018 and the UK Political Studies 
Association Media and Politics Group Annual Conference at the University of Nottingham in November 2018. I thank 
the participants in those events, particularly Samantha Bradshaw, Nick Couldry, David Karpf, Sarah Anne Ganter, 
Philip N. Howard, Daniel Kreiss, Shannon C. McGregor, Lisa-Maria Neudert, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Stuart Soroka, 
Talia Stroud, Cristian Vaccari, Peter Van Aelst, Gadi Wolfsfeld, and the audiences in all events. Any errors or 
shortcomings in this article are mine alone. 
A 
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n our post-2016 moment—after the inaccurate and misleading political advertising on 
Facebook in the Brexit referendum; after the disinformation and misinformation crisis of the 
2016 U.S. presidential campaign; after revelations of the massive scale of automated social 
media activity designed to manipulate public attention during key political events, some of it 
sponsored by Russian intelligence agencies; after the Cambridge Analytica/Facebook data 
breach scandal; and after the live-streamed New Zealand terrorist massacre of March 2019—
the mood among researchers of digital media and society is one of deep pessimism. So much 
has been lost of the optimistic visions for democratic change that once underlay scholarship in 
the field. Many pathologies of the present crisis were always there in some form, but were too 
often neglected (though see, for example, Daniels, 2009; Rojecki and Meraz, 2014). That being 
said, there is currently profound uncertainty about the long-term impact of all forms of digital 
media on civic life, but this is especially the case for social media platforms, which, for many 
people have become the de facto internet.  
In this piece, I argue that, as the post-2016 context becomes embedded, four stark 
epistemological challenges that have been generated by the legacy of research on digital media 
and politics now face researchers in this field. Analyses of digital media and politics have 
tended to: (1) select cases that are progressive or pro-liberal democratic; (2) employ what I 
term the engagement gaze; (3) underestimate the trade-offs between affective solidarity and 
rational deliberation; and (4) be driven by what I term the rationality expectation while 
underplaying the importance of indeterminacy in digital culture. Addressing these challenges—a 
project that is already underway across a wide array of research areas—is one way (and I 
hasten to add that it is only one way) to better equip the field for making sense of the new 
context moving forward. 
I also make a broader point in this piece, which boils down to the following: In the social 
sciences, there are times when it is useful to shift focus away from institutions and 
organizations and toward the analysis of impulses, emotions, identities, beliefs, and attitudes—
in other words, toward the disparate origins of the elusive phenomenon that has, for want of a 
better term, become known as “public opinion.” In the analysis of digital media and politics, that 
time is now. Twenty years of research, mostly driven by normatively pro-digital media 
perspectives—which have mainly focused on whether online “engagement” was being 
sufficiently embedded in political or journalistic organizational settings—has tended to 
marginalize some important questions about the precise nature of digital engagement and the 
origins and consequences of digitally-shaped attitudes more generally.  
I want to argue that this particular legacy, for all its analytical power, has made it more 
difficult for scholars to appreciate some problematic aspects of how digital media are reshaping 
how public opinion is formed and how the civic culture of liberal democracies is evolving.2 
 
 
Digital Media as Liberation Media—But Liberation for Whom? 
 
At the outset, we should bear in mind that, if judged against previously dominant media 
forms—particularly the broadcast media that so profoundly shaped society and politics during 
the twentieth century—digital media have always been liberation media; and, under certain 
conditions and in certain contexts, they still are. Current anxiety about the socially-destructive 
role of social media platforms—their monopoly power based on surveillance capitalism (Couldry 
& Mejias, 2019; Zuboff, 2019); their uses and abuses by political and corporate elites, or 
 
2 A new wave of research tackling these problems is now gaining momentum. It is impossible to do full justice to it 
here, but see, for example, Bastos and Mercea, 2019; Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018; Bennett & Livingston, 2018; 
Boler & Davis, 2018; Clayton, Blair, & Busam et al., 2019; Ging, Lynn, & Rosati, 2019; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; 
Noble, 2018; Quandt, 2018; Shin & Thorson, 2017; Sparkes-Vian, 2019; Starbird, 2017; Thorson et al., 2019; Vraga 
& Bode, 2018; Waisbord, 2018; Woolley & Howard, eds., 2018. 
I 
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movements of exclusionary populism, illiberalism, and intolerance (misogyny, racism, nativism, 
xenophobia, and religious fundamentalism)—often ignore the fact that there are many states 
around the world in which authoritarian power structures prevail, freedom is severely limited by 
government surveillance, and mainstream media organizations are either directly censored or 
subject to stifling political pressure. For human rights dissidents in such states, social media 
remain an important means of communicating, organizing, and mobilizing against monolithic 
oppression.  
 Authors such as Morozov (2011) were right to draw attention to the limits of the liberation 
media discourse that has been so influential in research on digital media and society. But it is 
still obvious that the communicative practices of totalitarian dictatorship witnessed during the 
high modernity of the mid-twentieth century are almost unimaginable today. This is, in large 
part, due to the radical redistribution of the means of communication that the internet, and 
social media platforms in particular, made possible from the mid-2000s onward. 
 That being said, three counterpoints to the universality of liberation media discourse 
stand out as important at this juncture. First, there are forces of concentrated power and 
monopoly that are now undermining the early normative ideal of digital media as liberation 
media. These are arguably most powerful and advanced in the global West and the global 
North, but their reach extends beyond. Yes, we need to put these in perspective. But it would 
be unwise to downplay them, blame them on a “moral panic,” and hope that things will go 
back to how they once were. Above all, it is the concentration in the dominant social media 
platforms of such diverse, multifaceted, yet often subtle forms of power over the economy of 
public attention that makes this task so urgent. It is all the more important given that, after the 
failure of alternative social media models, such as Diaspora and Mastodon, for example, and 
the inability of rival search engines to make much of a dent in Google’s dominance, there are 
now so few genuinely sustainable means of running large-scale digital services on the basis of 
nonprofit principles. And matters are complicated still further by the fact that many of the 
alternatives to the dominant platforms, for example Reddit, have in fact been important to the 
rise of online hatred and disinformation (see, for example, Ging, Lynn, & Rosati, 2019; Jane, 
2016). 
 A second counterpoint is that powerful social, economic, and political elites of all kinds 
have now adapted to the manifold threats once posed by digital media. From the integration of 
behavioural data and ad-tech in election campaigns, to the forward march, without sufficient 
ethical and political scrutiny, of digital data harvesting, surveillance, and networked forms of 
artificial intelligence (AI), it is now clear that, to paraphrase and augment Zuboff’s terms (2019: 
9), digital connection among individuals has become a means to others’ commercial and 
political ends. Earlier optimism about the potential role of digital behavioural data in increasing 
political organizations’ responsiveness to the “real” wants and needs of the public is becoming 
more difficult to sustain, particularly in the absence of serious and sustained attention to the 
ethical and political problems that are now inevitably arising from attempts to deploy AI at scale 
(Noble, 2018; Wolfram, 2019). 
 A third counterpoint to liberation media discourse is arguably more difficult for digital 
politics researchers to accept, even though it may be essential for renewing the public mission 
of scholarship in this field over the coming years. It is that the liberation media discourse that 
has animated so much of the scholarship and commentary on digital politics has always had a 
problematic orientation of benign neutrality toward online engagement. Betraying the internet’s 
roots in the U.S. constitution’s strong doctrine of freedom of expression, in this approach, 
engagement has almost always been promoted as a positive societal benefit of digital media. 
Too often, this assumption, for all its obvious democratic appeal, has occluded careful 
consideration of how engagement is structured in specific ways by social distinctions and 
technological affordances, who is engaging, to what ideological ends, and with what long-term 
consequences for liberal democratic societies. 
 This is, of course, an age-old problem of post-Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism, 
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so acutely observed by Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, among many others (see, for example, 
Bejan, 2017; Mounk, 2018). To what extent should societies tolerate the spread of behaviour 
and ideas that undermine the very foundations of liberal democracy’s unique blend of popular 
self-determination and individual rights? And yet, this problem is also at the core of so much 
current anxiety about the role of social media in the spread of hatred and intolerance—from 
debates about online racism, xenophobia, and misogyny, to concerns about the coordinated 
online glorification and viral circulation of terrorist violence, to the appeal of exclusionary, anti-
immigrant populism and extreme partisan online news. In the United Kingdom, this faultline ran 
through the entirety of the government’s extraordinarily wide-ranging consultation on how to 
regulate the online sphere, the 2019 Online Harms White Paper. Discussions about 
democratically dysfunctional communicative behaviour in many other liberal democratic polities, 
including France, Germany, Italy, and even the United States, to name but a few, exhibit the 
same antinomy. 
 Confronting these problems is uncomfortable, but necessary, and scholars of digital 
media and politics are well-placed to contribute. Sides will have to be taken. But taking sides 
will also require good-quality evidence. The production of this kind of evidence requires 
rethinking some of the assumptions we bring to our research, the objects of analysis on which 
we focus, and the conceptual scaffolding on which we build explanations, as the post-2016 
research agenda continues to blossom. 
 
 
Four Challenges for Future Research 
 
The legacy of research on digital media and politics over the last two decades presents four 
interrelated challenges for present and future work in the field. I should also add, in passing, 
that some of my own previous research has almost certainly contributed to them. 
 
1. Analyses of digital media and politics have tended to select cases that are 
progressive or pro-liberal democratic 
 
The growth of digital politics scholarship over the last two decades has mostly been fuelled by 
analyses of broadly progressive or pro-democratic cases (Schradie, 2019). Probably the best 
examples of this were the outpourings of optimistic scholarship on the 2008 Obama campaign 
and the events of 2010–2011 that prematurely became known as the Arab Spring. At the level 
of individual interventions, probably the most significant landmark was Shirky’s highly influential 
book Here Comes Everybody (2008). But the selection bias extends in diverse ways across all 
kinds of cases, from political parties to social movements, to community activism, to news and 
journalism, and to critiques of the dominant social media companies themselves.3  
 The roots of this bias are deep and manifold, but one explanation is that much 
scholarship on digital media emerged from an almost instinctive critique of the elitism of the 
mass media system. The explosion of the internet at the turn of this century proved so exciting 
because it appeared to be sweeping all of that away. It promised to usher in new forms of 
politics characterized by flatter hierarchies, the empowerment of the previously powerless, and 
a new culture of openness, tolerance, and global cosmopolitanism. So many of the central 
animating concepts in digital politics research owed their origins to this reaction against the 
past: the decline of traditional journalistic gatekeepers, the horizontality of network connections, 
the rise of decentralized and “leaderless” quasi-organizations, the “wisdom of the crowd,” the 
breaking apart of monolithic government and party bureaucracies, the elective affinities 
 
3 This generalization about the dominance of specific assumptions may not satisfy all readers, but consider the two 
major handbooks of digital politics research (Chadwick and Howard, Eds., 2009; Coleman and Freelon, 2015). 
Material examining non-progressive cases is noticeably absent from both volumes. 
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between digital media and the new, looser, individualistic identities of progressive 
postmaterialism and environmental protest, to name but a few.  
 These disparate themes all seemed tied together for scholars who came of age 
intellectually with the critiques of politics, society, and media that inspired so many social 
scientists during the 1990s—those whose outlook was shaped by the collapse of the Berlin 
wall in 1989 and the writings of Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu, and Castells—again, to name 
but a few. The internet and digital media looked like the technology of a new era of freedom. 
Concentrations of power in the hands of state and corporate elites would supposedly diminish 
and the authentic voices of marginalized, previously under-represented groups would find 
untrammelled expression in the public sphere, free from the arid conformity of the past. 
 All of that did happen, of course. But we now face the reality that some of the most 
consequential attitudes and behaviours enabled by digital media have not been particularly pro-
liberal democratic or progressive. Consider, for example, inauthentic social media expression, 
such as the role of automated bots in social media commentary during the televised debates of 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Kollanyi, Howard, & Wolley, 2016) and the Brexit 
referendum (Bastos & Mercea, 2019). Or social media expression designed to cultivate the 
spread of misinformation, mutual mistrust, intolerance, and hatred, such as right-wing 
commenters’ deliberate targeting of news articles about immigration (Quandt, 2018). Or the 
ways in which the (partly) algorithmically-determined “folksonomic” hierarchies of misogyny on 
the Urban Dictionary platform insinuate themselves into the broader economy of online 
attention, due to the prevalence of the site’s entries in Google’s search rankings (Ging, Lynn, & 
Rosati, 2019). Or the civically ambivalent motivations that lead people to share false and 
misleading information—and the regularity with which they do so (Chadwick, Vaccari, and 
O’Loughlin, 2018; Chadwick and Vaccari, 2019). Or the unfortunate stereotype that the “dark 
web” and non-mainstream social media sites have been “radical, progressive, socialist, 
anarchist, feminist, queer, or anti-racist” (Gehl, 2015) when, in fact, many such sites have also 
hosted content that is directly opposed to such values. 
 The conceptual and methodological tools to come to terms with these developments are 
now being built. Researchers are focusing their attention on the intolerant and democratically 
dysfunctional aspects of digital media engagement. It is important to continue to redress the 
imbalance created by the previous tendency to focus on optimistic, pro-democratic outcomes.  
 
2. Research on digital media and politics has tended to employ the engagement gaze 
 
The second epistemological challenge I want to highlight leads on from the first. It is that 
research on digital media and politics has tended to employ the engagement gaze. By the 
engagement gaze I mean that most research on digital media has assumed that more 
engagement unproblematically creates more democratic goods for the media system and the 
polity. The problem here is that the engagement gaze has conditioned researchers to look for 
evidence of engagement, and, wherever they find it, celebrate it as an unalloyed good. This 
gaze has involved underplaying the importance of three factors that ought to be considered 
when appraising any form of engagement: first, the substantive ideological and political goals of 
those who engage; second, the extent to which the consciously-designed incentive structures 
of any communication environment can make it more likely that some types of engagement will 
erode liberal democratic norms of authenticity, rationality, and tolerance; and third, the 
likelihood that new pathways to engagement will likely have longer-term, systemic 
consequences for the civic culture of politics. 
 Shelley Boulianne’s remarkable meta-analysis of 320 survey-based journal articles on 
digital media and political participation—more than twenty years of published research—is 
instructive (Boulianne, 2018).4 Very few of those 320 articles have much to say about the 
 
4 I thank Shelley Boulianne for sending me the full variable list for her 2018 article. Any errors or shortcomings in my 
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substantive ideological and political goals of the participation they analyzed. Ideology appears 
in only 14 percent of the 320 studies and almost always as an explanatory variable, divorced 
from any specific intentions or outcomes of participation. Motivations and goals mostly go 
unmeasured, too, unhelpfully obscured by the seemingly benign neutrality of the engagement 
construct. Nor did many of those 320 studies have much to say about how digital media 
affordances, such as the algorithmic sorting of information in news feeds and other relevant 
technological design factors, enable and constrain engagement in consequential ways (Thorson 
et al, 2019). Boulianne’s analysis covered quantitative survey research but the engagement 
gaze has been equally common in qualitative and case-study based work. 
 The engagement gaze is an academic problem, but it also has its roots in the discourses 
of Silicon Valley and of the “platform” (or what Stephen Wolfram (2019), in his testimony to the 
U.S. Congress, termed the “automated content selection business”) that have been so 
important for the expansion of social media companies. Constructing engagement with a gloss 
of benign neutrality has suited social media companies perfectly. It offered the promise of 
rapidly expanding user numbers without the chore of having to pay too much attention to the 
costly business of policing content on their platforms or considering the trade-offs of using 
design affordances such as the algorithmic news feed, which can nudge people to spend 
greater time on the platform because it prioritizes information that accords with their attitudinal 
biases. 
 This legacy of underplaying ideological and political goals, illiberal motivations, 
problematic technological design, and long-term consequences has made it more difficult for 
scholars of digital media and politics to adapt to the post-2016 climate. The neglect of people’s 
ideological goals when they engage online is understandable because it enables academics to 
avoid accusations of political “bias.” But this neglect has also opened up opportunities for 
individuals, groups, and movements who deliberately seek to produce and circulate ideas that 
undermine liberal democratic norms. All of this is justifiable when engagement is treated with 
benign neutrality, as it is under the engagement gaze. The neglect of problematic technological 
design is, in large part, a symptom of the lack of transparency by the social media companies 
themselves and the lack of a proper structure of public accountability for auditing the effects of 
algorithmic and machine learning based sorting of information. 
 The first challenge I have outlined is relatively soluble: researchers can analyze non-
progressive cases and focus on the ideological and political goals of engagement. The second 
challenge is more difficult. We can hope that there is sufficient public and political pressure on 
social media companies to open up their data and algorithmic methods to responsible 
researchers. But the third and fourth challenges I want to outline move things onto more 
troubling terrain.  
 
3. Research on digital media and politics has often underestimated the trade-offs 
between affective solidarity and rational deliberation 
 
The third epistemological challenge is that previous research on digital media and politics has 
tended to underestimate the inevitable trade-offs between affective solidarity and rational 
deliberation. 
 A new wave of research has foregrounded emotion as a key force in media, politics, and 
journalism (e.g. Papacharissi, 2015; Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019; Wahl Jorgensen, 2018). But 
a central tension runs through this work. As Papacharissi has demonstrated, affect can interact 
with the affordances of social media, particularly circulation, repetition, and recursion, and play 
a role in opinion formation and mobilization by contributing to the social solidarity and identity 
that are essential precursors to collective action (Papacharissi, 2015). But the social force of 
affect online is also such that the identities from which it springs, and which it shapes and 
 
analysis of her data are my responsibility. 
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reinforces, can be highly resistant to challenge and subversion. Online, identity based on 
affective ties seems to become particularly difficult to dislodge. This point underlies much of the 
anxiety about “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers,” it informs much of the empirical research 
on misinformation and misperceptions, and, as Kreiss argues, it may ultimately imply the 
fracturing of civic epistemology: “the basis upon which people understand and agree upon 
political facts and truths” (Kreiss, 2017; see also Waisbord, 2018). Arlie Russell Hochschild’s 
book Strangers in their Own Land (2016), about conservative identity in the American South, is 
instructive in this regard. While Hochschild has little to say about digital media, she does reveal 
much about how, in local communities, complex, multi-layered emotional substructures 
condition daily life and attitudes to political and economic authority. This provides a useful 
orientation for exploring the roots of intolerance and misinformation online (see Davies, 2017; 
Kreiss et al., 2017). 
 Animating affective divides is what Hochschild terms “deep stories.” A deep story is 
essentially an overarching, metaphorical sensibility. It serves as an emotionally-charged basis 
for everyday orientations toward social, cultural, economic, and political reality. The deep story 
feeds identity, social division, and resentment toward the other side, however that side is 
defined. As Hochschild puts it: “A deep story is a feels-as-if story—it’s the story feelings tell, in 
the language of symbols. It removes judgment. It removes fact. It tells us how things feel…. 
And I don’t believe we understand anyone’s politics, right or left, without it. For we all have a 
deep story” (135). 
 Concerns about online echo chambers may have been exaggerated, not least because 
both the empirical evidence for their existence and their social and political implications have 
always been contested (Bakshy et al, 2015; Barberá et al, 2015; Bruns, 2019; Bucher, 2018; 
Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Settle, 2018; Stromer-Galley, 2003; Sunstein, 2001; Sunstein, 2017; 
Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). But much of the research on this topic was conducted before the 
mass use of social media and its focus has often been diffuse. Is it about lack of diversity in 
people’s media and information diets? If so, there is little evidence that this is the case. Or is it 
that the ideologically committed tend to seal themselves off, in the interests of rapid and 
concerted mobilization based on emotional outrage? The evidence for the latter is more 
weighty. The post-2016 context is now generating evidence that the ways in which social 
media platforms have positioned behavioural metrics and algorithmic sorting of content at the 
centre of their business models for garnering attention can shape group attitudes and 
behaviour (Settle, 2018; Stewart et al., 2019). The U.S. fake news factories and bot crises of 
the 2016 campaign provide evidence of how Facebook’s news feed and Twitter’s hashtags 
have introduced surprising new vulnerabilities in the economy of attention, but the problem is a 
larger one: content that reinforces one’s identity is now more accessible than ever to those in 
society who are motivated to have their identity reinforced, even if that identity is based on 
democratically dysfunctional norms, such as the refusal—fuelled by misogyny, xenophobia, or 
racism—to hear the other side. Boler and Davis (2018) have introduced the concept of 
“affective feedback loops” to capture this convergence of algorithmic cues and social identity. 
Decades of research in communication and political psychology on fluency, confirmation bias, 
selective exposure, and motivated reasoning has demonstrated that many people are 
predisposed to having their attitudes reinforced by their media consumption habits (Stroud, 
2010), but we are only in the early stages of learning about how selective exposure informs 
people’s online production and sharing (Shin & Thorson, 2017). 
 When an understandable cognitive bias—the need to have one’s views reinforced, to 
reduce risk and uncertainty—converges with social media affordances—for example, visible 
metrics and cues and the algorithmic curation of search, feeds, and hashtags—the heady mix 
is highly conducive to building collective action through affective solidarity, even if the 
informational context may be based on falsehoods. But this scenario is not so beneficial for 
rational deliberation and building consensus through recognition and respect for difference. The 
inevitable trade-offs for liberal democratic political culture caused by this tension ought to be 
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examined more carefully in future research. 
 Technological affordances have played only a minor role in traditional public opinion 
scholarship, which has been mostly about the message, not the medium. And yet, public 
opinion research has paid attention to problematic aspects of how public opinion is formed, for 
example through the study of elite cues (see for example Edelman, 1988; Zaller, 1992). It has 
also considered the limits to genuinely informed public opinion when media exposure is 
conditioned by partisanship, polarization, and motivated reasoning (for an overview see Flynn, 
Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017). Attention to how the affordances of digital media interact with the 
social and psychological constraints that we know shape all citizens’ reasoning about public 
affairs can update these approaches. And, of course, we should also bear in mind that social 
media affordances are not always as they appear on the surface. They are vulnerable to being 
exploited, often in hidden ways, by actors of various kinds who seek to distort the economy of 
attention and influence public opinion through subterfuge, spreading false rumours, or splicing 
together information from a range of different sources, some reputable, some less so (Kollanyi, 
Howard, & Woolley, 2016; Rojecki & Meraz, 2014; Stewart et al, 2019). 
 As social media increased in popularity after the late-2000s, attention to elite cues was 
mostly sidelined in favour of conceptual frameworks that focused on what seemed to be so 
“new” about “new media”: individual agency, the erosion of traditional gatekeepers, and “user-
generated content” (e.g. Bruns, 2008). But we now face many important questions about elite 
persuasion. While it has been reconfigured, it remains of importance for the formation of public 
opinion and political behaviour. An important task, then, is to identify the elite origins of 
affectively charged misinformation and the conditions under which it spreads online, exposing 
potentially large numbers to content which—and this is crucial—many then choose to curate 
and share in their own social media networks (Thorson & Wells, 2016). 
 
4. Research on digital media and politics has mostly been driven by the rationality 
expectation and has underplayed the importance of indeterminacy in digital culture 
 
By the rationality expectation I mean the assumption that individuals are reflective, act on the 
best information available in the media system, and that the best resources for that action are 
to be found online, because the internet supposedly has comparatively few biases and 
distortions impacting the production and circulation of political knowledge. As Hedrick et al 
(2018) have argued in a similar vein, much research about digital media and politics has been 
informed by the assumption of an “earnest internet.” This, they suggest, “generally posits that 
people act rationally and in good faith; care about facts, truth, and authenticity; [and] pursue 
ends in line with their political and social values and aspirations…” 
 This assumption has seldom been questioned in research on digital politics, though new 
research is now moving beyond this complacency. For example, it is becoming clear just how 
widespread trolling and other behaviour that does not fit the rationality expectation is on the so-
called “ambivalent internet” (Karpf, 2017; Phillips, 2016; Phillips & Milner, 2017; UK Department 
of Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport, 2019). A more general problem is how slippery 
authenticity has now become in digitally mediated communication. This goes beyond the much 
older argument that self-reflexivity and “playfulness” are important parts of online culture (see 
for example Turkle, 1995). Now, playfulness is implicated in a much broader culture of 
generalized indeterminacy implicating powerful and large-scale organizational actors. Significant 
majorities of the public now report that, online, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish what is 
authentic and sincere from what is inauthentic and insincere. This is visible in the slump in 
people’s trust in online news and information, as evidenced across many countries in recent 
survey reports by Pew (2018) and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (RISJ).5 
 
5 Only 44 percent of people in 37 countries the RISJ surveyed for their 2018 Digital News Report said they trust 
news overall. But only 34 percent said they trust news found via search and a mere 23 percent trust news found on 
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 The problems are compounded when one considers two points. First, there is emerging 
evidence that sizeable minorities of the individuals who share problematic news and other 
information online are doing so in ways that contribute to the decline of trust in the public 
sphere (Chadwick and Vaccari, 2019). Second, although survey research shows that only a 
minority of the public trusts news they find through search engines and social media, those 
same surveys show that search engines and social media are extremely popular gateways for 
discovering news. So, we are faced with the twin paradoxes that many people increasingly 
distrust the news and information that they themselves play a role in circulating on social 
media, and most people say that they value encountering news via media they mostly distrust. 
 Moving beyond the rationality expectation opens up possibilities for understanding these 
and other pathologies of today’s online politics, from the strategically-deployed techniques of 
“irony” and “satire” so often used in the expression of racism, homophobia, and sexism on 
mainstream social media platforms and the increasingly popular alt-right sites such as 4Chan, 
8Chan, and Gab, to the bizarre, insider memes of the #GamerGate movement opposed to 
women’s influence in public life (Hawley, 2017; Nagle, 2017). 
 One seriously pernicious contributor to this culture of indeterminacy is so-called 
“deepfake” video. It is worth reflecting on some if the implications of this development. 
 It is deepfakes’ unusual technological proficiency and their ease of production and 
distribution—all achieved through multiple acts of digital engagement, of course—that defines 
their contribution to the new online culture of indeterminacy. Deepfakes have particular 
technological characteristics that set them apart from other forms of disinformation, and which 
unsettle some conventional wisdom about how audiences make sense of problematic 
information. The most important of these is that they rely upon AI “deep learning” that uses 
already publicly available online video and audio to reconstruct representations of individuals. 
Granted, deception of one kind or another has always been an important part of mediation; 
political fakery is as old as politics itself. Visual representation has often hinged on the 
manipulation of the boundaries between the real and the imagined, and audiences quickly 
became attuned to the dramatic conceits made possible by increasingly sophisticated editing 
technologies in the professional entertainment industry (see Gunning, 1989). People learn to 
distinguish between the factual and fictional modes of communication that often coexist in the 
same artefact, or they suspend their disbelief. At the same time, the nearest thing to an iron law 
of both audience research in communication and misinformation research in political science is 
that prior beliefs, socially situated knowledge, experience, and cultural orientation all play 
important roles in shaping how we appraise attempts to persuade or mislead us. Audiences 
interrogate and selectively decode (e.g. Hall, 1979/2001); citizens engage in motivated 
reasoning based on their “priors” (Flynn et al., 2017). And, given the numbers who now share 
photos and videos online, it is clear that the internet’s visual turn has proved popular because 
practices such as distributed citizen witnessing have promised a close correspondence 
between authentic, unmediated social reality and the flow of public representations of that 
reality. 
 Yet political deepfakes do not sit easily with these established understandings of 
audiences and authenticity, precisely because deepfakes are such accomplished forms of 
nonfictional, visual deception. They leave little interpretive space into which audiences might 
introduce oppositional readings. Prior beliefs, experiences, and cultural orientations may shape 
how individuals make sense of deepfakes, but to what extent? Many political deepfakes will 
rest on their visual representations or on skilful combinations of visual and verbal elements. In 
these cases, the undetectable nature of the deception challenges the idea that audience 
members will be able to effectively mobilize their pre-existing cognitive and informational 
resources—political knowledge, awareness of news and current events, lived experiences, and 
cultural reference points, or even their basic familiarity with the appearance and gestures of a 
 
social media. 
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political candidate—to actively make sense of a deepfake. 
 Deepfake video thus presents some serious challenges to the rationality expectation. 
Indeed, one symptom of the problem is that they have caused divisions among the global anti-
disinformation and fact-checking communities. Some have argued that a more serious problem 
is so-called “shallow” fakes—simple photoshopping of still images, or the use of misleading 
captions, for example. There is also the view that, by drawing attention to deepfakes, scholars 
and journalists may unwittingly contribute to a culture of indeterminacy by creating the 
perception that nothing can be trusted. In turn, the argument runs, this may empower those 
who benefit from disinformation (e.g. Wardle, 2019). But this argument misses a broader one. If 
other forms of deception have historically been more prevalent than deepfakes, it does not 
necessarily follow that scholars and journalists should not pay attention to the problem of 
deepfakes. And although there have been plenty of examples of when deceptive visual content 
has spread online, that content has, after all, been much easier to identify than deepfakes, 
which is the central point.6 
 If deepfakes become a regular feature of political events, as is already the case with fake 
social media accounts, fake news websites, and social media bots, one possible outcome is 
that healthy citizen skepticism turns to cynicism and apathy—the withdrawal that accompanies 
the attitude that so little political information online can be trusted because establishing the 
truth is so exhausting. Fears about disinformation often hinge on whether people will be directly 
deceived by falsehoods, but the lesson of the past is that people are just as likely to become 
uncertain about the truth and withdraw into the private sphere. This was an important strand of 
dissident critiques of the neo-Stalinist states in Eastern Europe (e.g. Havel, 1985) and it has its 
origins in revisionist accounts of propaganda that focus, not on mass deception, but on how a 
culture of distrust generates perceptions of chaos and indeterminacy that frees illiberal elites to 
promise to restore order and certainty, while curtailing liberal democratic rights (e.g. Arendt, 
1968). It also frees illiberal elites (and now non-elites) to wilfully mislead—because so little can 
be trusted. As legal scholars Robert Chesney and Danielle Keats Citron have argued in their 
analysis of deepfakes, this “makes it easier for liars to avoid accountability for things that are in 
fact true” (Chesney and Citron, 2018). 
 We are already seeing signs of this culture of indeterminacy. For example, Toff and 
Nielsen’s qualitative research in the north of England has shown that “I don’t know what to 
believe” has become one important response to the uncertainties of encountering news on 
social media and private messaging apps (Toff and Nielsen, 2018). Meanwhile, Petersen at al 
(2018) have gathered survey data that shows what they term a “need for chaos” is an important 
motivation among those in Western democracies who share false rumours and conspiracy 
theories. As the authors put it, “the sharing of hostile political rumours is not motivated by a 
desire to aid actors within the system. Instead, it is motivated by a desire to tear down the 
system.” By their estimates, such motivations are present among about 40 percent of the U.S. 
population (Petersen et al, 2018).  
 All of this points to an unsettling vision of the future, but to see it and address it requires 
relaxing the rationality expectation and coming to grips with some of the wilder frontiers of 
online mis- and disinformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 A further proxy indicator that deepfakes are to be taken seriously is that social media companies themselves have 
issued public statements that, if unchecked, they are likely to harm their business models. See, for example, Mark 
Zuckerberg’s announcement in June 2019 (https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/zuckerberg-
very-good-case-deepfakes-are-completely-different-from-misinformation/592681) and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s 
November 2019 announcement that Twitter will ban political advertising on the platform 
(https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952).  
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Conclusion 
 
In this article I have argued that research on digital media and politics ought to be recalibrated 
to explain how digital media can shape public opinion in ways that are dysfunctional for liberal 
democratic societies.  
 Overcoming four epistemological challenges from the legacy of research on digital media 
and politics will (and is) proving central to this task: the tendency to: select cases that are 
progressive or pro-liberal democratic; the tendency to employ the engagement gaze; 
underestimating the trade-offs between affective solidarity and rational deliberation; and the 
tendency to be driven by the rationality expectation and neglect the importance of 
indeterminacy in digital culture.  
 There are no easy and singular solutions to these challenges, but it is also the case that 
addressing them is already underway across the social sciences. The overarching issue is that 
disinformation, misinformation, hatred, and intolerance are radically networked like never 
before, and the raw materials for individuals and organizations to behave in democratically 
dysfunctional ways are diverse and multiple. 
 In the context of this new crisis of public communication, much of the work is likely to 
focus on explaining how social, psychological, and technological variables converge in ways 
that shape how individuals form identities and opinions about the political world.  
 Can we fruitfully integrate these objects of analysis—social and psychological variables 
and the affordances of digital media—to help understand how liberal democracy is evolving, 
now that the great expansion of social media platforms is nearing completion? Can we develop 
better understandings of how social media interact with, and potentially reconfigure, the 
different constraints on rational opinion formation at the individual level? Is it possible to identify 
the blend of cognitive biases, social identities, and affordances that align to produce 
democratically dysfunctional forces that threaten the foundations of liberal democracy? And, 
finally—perhaps the biggest challenge of all—can we, as scholars, effectively intervene in public 
and policy debates to minimize the impact of these forces in the interests of promoting liberal 
democratic norms of tolerance and trust? 
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